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Abstract
In the 1990’s the productivity growth in the USA and in the
EU changed in opposite sense: until it was decelerating in Eu-
rope, till it was accelerating significantly in the USA. In this
essay I am going to search for the explanation of these oppo-
site tendencies studying the sectoral differences and analysing
structure of the investments, capital formation and the marginal
productivity of capital. The sectoral differences in productivity
growth highlight the major differences in terms of the growth ex-
perienced in the two regions. This is evidence for the structural
rigidity of the European economy, which is much less flexible
in comparison with its American counterpart. I reveal that the
fixed capital stock in the USA expanded in a structure and to a
degree that promotes growth to a much higher extent. The data
analysed below convincingly show how much less of an impact
the ICT revolution had on the economy and society of the EU
than in USA, and how much less capable these leaps and bounds
in technological development were to transform and dynamize
the European Union than the United States.
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1 Introduction
A technological shift of particularly great effect took place in
the 1990s in the economy of developed countries. This tech-
nological shift, which could fundamentally be characterized as
a revolutionary development and transformation of information
and communication technologies (ICT), was partly the cause
and partly a consequence of two other processes simultaneously
taking place: globalization and the emergence of the informa-
tion society.
As will be shown later, the development of information and
communication technologies became the primary scene of the
research and development efforts in this period, and as a result
of these achievements, the growth in productivity in the fields of
both production and use became the most important component
of overall productivity.
2 A Sectoral Study of the Difference in the Growth of
Productivity in the USA and the EU
Fig. 1 indicates that in the period under review there was a
positive correlation between the use of information technologies
and the acceleration of the growth of total factor productivity
(TFP), which is the most sensitive to technological development
within productivity growth. Therefore, when examining the pro-
ductivity growth of the past decades, it is particularly important
to examine the productivity growth data in such a distribution
that considers ICT-related and non-ICT areas separately.
The sectoral differences in productivity growth highlight the
major differences in terms of the growth experienced in the two
regions. Table 1 divides the entirety of the economy into three
major areas: ICT producing, ICT-using and non-ICT indus-
tries1. Within each of these we can differentiate between manu-
facturing and service industries. The table clearly shows that, in
this grouping, the advantage of the USA in terms of productivity
growth in is not distributed evenly at all; in fact, there are some
areas where a higher productivity growth can be identified in the
EU.
1 For further details on the exact definitions and the sectoral taxonomies, cf.
O’Mahony, M – van Ark, B (ed.) (2003). The study is also a major source of the
description of the measurement methodology[1, 3].
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 Internet Hosts Per 1,000 Inhabitants, 1998 Source: Porter, M. E. – van
Opstal, D. (2005)
Fig. 1. Higher IT Usage Correlated with Higher Productivity Growth Per-
cent Change in Multifactor Productivity Growth (using average growth rates in
1981–95 and 1996–98) and Number of Internet Hosts, 1998
From the table it can be seen that, even though the EU pro-
ductivity growth was somewhat faster (by 0.7% per year) in the
first half of the period examined, but in the second half of the
1990s it was the USA that achieved a higher rate of productivity
growth. The difference by this time was 1.1% per year in favour
of the USA. The overall 1.9% improvement of the position of the
USA in comparison with the EU can be attributed to a smaller
extent (0.5%) to the decelerating productivity growth of the EU,
and to a greater extent (1.4%) to the accelerating productivity
growth of the USA, which more than doubled.
3 The Tendencies of Decelerating Productivity Growth
in the EU
In the first half of the 1990s, the highest rate of productivity
growth in the EU, much above all other sectors, was experienced
in the ICT industries, and specifically in ICT manufacturing, but
the other ICT-related industry, i.e. ICT services was also close
behind occupying the second position.
The deceleration of productivity growth in the second of the
1990s in the EU was decisively due to the large-scale (-0.9%)
decline in the productivity growth on non-ICT industries. This
(has) had serious consequences for two reasons: on the one
hand, non-ICT industries still accounted for more than two-
thirds of the entire EU economy in 2000. On the other hand,
in the EU the two other sectors were not able to exercise a sig-
nificant counterbalancing effect either. Even in case of ICT use,
which has a share of 27% in the economy of the EU, a slight (-
0.1%) decrease in the rate of productivity growth was measured,
and it was only the ICT manufacturing industries, representing a
mere 5.9%, that registered a 2% acceleration in the productivity
growth (from 6.7% to 8.7%).
If the available data are analysed in a distribution of manufac-
turing vs. services, we find that the rate of productivity growth
decreased both in the field of production and in services. Much
more significant, however, is the effect of the decrease of pro-
ductivity growth in the field of manufacturing (in the combined
change of productivity growth rate, the deceleration in the field
of manufacturing causes a decrease of -0.29%, while the decel-
Tab. 1. Productivity growth and GDP shares of ICT-producing, ICT-using
and non-ICT industries in the EU and the U.S.
Productivity growth GDP share
1990-1995 1995-2000 2000
EU USA EU USA EU USA
Total Economy 1.9 1.1 1.4 2.5 100 100
ICT Producing Indus-
tries
6.7 8.1 8.7 10.1 5.9 7.3
ICT Producing Manu-
facturing
11.1 15.1 13.8 23.7 1.6 2.6
ICT Producing Services 4.4 3.1 6.5 1.8 4.3 4.7
ICT Using Industries 1.7 1.5 1.6 4.7 27.0 30.6
ICT Using Manufactur-
ing
3.1 -0.3 2.1 1.2 5.9 4.3
ICT Using Services 1.1 1.9 1.4 5.4 21.1 26.3
Non-ICT Industries 1.6 0.2 0.7 0.5 67.1 62.1
Non-ICT Manufacturing 3.8 3.0 1.5 1.4 11.9 9.3
Non-ICT Services 0.6 -0.4 0.2 0.4 44.7 43.0
Non-ICT Other 2.7 0.7 1.9 0.6 10.5 9.8
Source: Ark, B. van, R. Inklaar és R.H. McGuckin (2003a)
eration in the field of services produces only one-tenth of this
effect, a deceleration of -0.026%).
Within the productivity decrease of 0.9% related to non-ICT
industries that played a primary role in the deceleration of the
productivity growth of the EU in the second half of the 1990s,
the biggest factor was the decrease of the productivity growth of
non-ICT manufacturing to less than two-fifths of its former level
(from 3.8% to 1.5% per year). This is what the decrease in the
field of manufacturing, discussed in the previous paragraph, is
fundamentally due to. Behind the relatively stable overall pro-
ductivity growth rate of ICT-using industries, at the same time,
there are opposite tendencies. While the productivity growth
rate significantly decreased in case of ICT-using manufacturing
(from 3.1% to 2.1%), ICT-using services actually registered a
slight (0.3%) increase in the productivity growth rate.
On the whole we can highlight two sectors from among the
other sectors that each had a smaller impact on the overall
change and almost exactly cancelling out each other’s effects:
the non-ICT manufacturing and the non-ICT services sectors,
which had a fundamental effect and determined the decline of
the productivity growth rate that took place in the EU. The 0.5%
decrease of the productivity growth rate in the EU was due in
60% to the 0.4% decrease (from 0.6% to 0.2%) of the rate of pro-
ductivity growth of non-ICT services, which represent 44.7% in
the EU economy, and in approximately 40% to the decrease of
2.3% (from 3.8% to 1.5%) registered in non-ICTmanufacturing,
which has a 11.9% share in the European economy.
It is worth paying particular attention to these data, which
suggest that the deceleration of productivity growth rate expe-
rienced in the EU practically happened independently from the
ICT revolution taking place in a parallel way.
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4 Doubling Productivity Growth Rate in the USA
As shown before, the acceleration of the productivity growth
rate in the USA is mostly due to the shift in the proportions that
took place. The annual acceleration rate of 1.4% can be consid-
ered as very significant, as the use was thus able to more than
double its rate of productivity growth rate. All of the sectors
contributed to this productivity growth rate, but by far not to the
same extent. The main accelerator of productivity growth was
the increase of the productivity growth rate measured in the ICT-
using industries from 1.5% to 4.7%. The more than tripled pro-
ductivity rate growth (3.2%) of these sectors itself, representing
a 30.6% share in the economy of the USA, increased by almost
1% the overall productivity growth rate of the American econ-
omy. The 2% and 0.3% acceleration of the productivity growth
rate in the other two sectors (ICT manufacturing, representing
a 7.3%, and non-ICT industries, accounting for a 62.1% share
in the economy, respectively) only contributed the remaining,
approximately 0.4% increase in the rate of growth.
A deeper analysis shows that, although there were also pro-
cesses of opposite directions within the ICT and non-ICT in-
dustries, and the productivity growth rate actually decreased in
altogether 3 sub-sectors (ICT services, non-ICT manufacturing,
non-ICT other), the effect of these on the overall increase of
productivity was slight (the combined effect of the above three
sub-sectors also caused a decrease of -0.22% in the productivity
growth rate). The opposite effect of basically any of the other
four sectors showing an accelerating productivity growth rate
would compensate this slight adverse effect.
If the primary division is not made into categories of ICT pro-
ducing, ICT-using and non-ICT categories, but rather according
to manufacturing and service areas, we can see that even though
the effect of both areas is positive on the change of the com-
bined productivity growth rate, still the effect of the changes in
the service areas (0.938%) is much more significant than that
of the manufacturing areas (0.225%). The main reason for this
is the much bigger economic weight of services, rather than a
most significant acceleration in the given area or a higher level
of productivity growth rate.
Overall, the biggest role in the 1.4% acceleration of the pro-
ductivity growth rate of the American economy in the second
half of the 1990s was played by the 3.5% acceleration of the
growth rate in the ICT-using service sector. Since this area had a
26.3% share in the entire economy, the acceleration experienced
here was able in itself to exercise a 0.921% positive effect on the
increasing of the productivity of the USA. Fundamentally due
to its proportion in the overall economy (43%), the effect of the
0.8% acceleration of the productivity growth rate of non-ICT
services can also be considered as significant (0.344%), simi-
larly to ICT producing manufacturing (0.224), which only has a
very low share in the economy (2.6%), but registered an extraor-
dinary acceleration of growth rate (8.6%).
If we examine the proportions represented in the overall in-
crease of economic productivity by ICT-related sectors and non-
ICT related sectors respectively, we will find major differences
between the two. In the second half of the 1990s, a mere 12.5%
of the productivity growth of USA was due to the acceleration of
the productivity growth rate of non-ICT sectors. By contrast, in
the EU approximately one-third of the productivity growth took
place in the non-ICT sectors.
The more detailed breakdown is also interesting: while the
proportion of ICT-related productivity growth in the USA is 2/3
to 1/3 for ICT use and ICT production, respectively, the same
proportion in the EU is 46:54. The production increasing effect
of ICT in the USA, therefore, carried over to the users much
more in the USA than in the EU.
5 The Relative Changes of the Productivity Growth
Rates
My findings with respect to the relative productivity growth
rate position changes are summarized in Table 2. The first and
the second columns of the table show the differences between
the productivity growth rates achieved in the two areas for the
two time periods examined. The USA productivity growth rate
figures are shown as with positive signs, and the EU data with
negative signs. Where the resulting difference was a negative
number, the productivity growth rate of the EU was faster, while
in areas were the difference was a positive number, the produc-
tivity growth rate was higher in the USA. The third column
shows the relative changes that took place in the productivity
growth rate of the two regions in the different areas. The column
contains the difference between the data of the first and the sec-
ond columns; in other words, data with a positive sign indicate
how much the USA productivity growth position changed in the
second half of the 1990s over the first half of the decade, while
figures preceded by a minus sign indicate the more favourable
changes in the productivity growth position of the EU in the
given area.
As can be seen in the table, the increase in the productivity of
EU countries was still higher in the majority of the sectors in the
period between 1990 and 1995. It can also be noticed however
already in these data that the advantage of the European Union
is typical in those non-ICT industries that another distribution,
prioritizing technological progress would, in all certainty, not
place in the first position. The results in ICT-related industries
are more varied across the two continents already in this period;
in fact, we can safely say that (given the great economic weight
of ICT-using services in the USA) the United States is slightly
in the lead.
As far as the deeper distribution is concerned, the biggest ad-
vantage of the EU in terms of productivity growth rate in the
period between 1990 and 1995 was in the field of ICT-using
manufacturing, while the biggest shortfall was in ICT produc-
ing manufacturing. The productivity growth advantage of the
EU was higher in five of the seven sectors than the average ad-
vantage of the EU, and there were only two sectors where the
advantage is lower than average. At the same time, in case of
Different characteristic features regarding the productivity increase... 52006 14 1
these two sectors (ICT producing manufacturing and ICT-using
services) it was already the USA that led in terms of the produc-
tivity growth rate.
Tab. 2. Changes in the relative productivity growth of the EU and the USA
in the 1990s
Productivity growth rate The change of
difference rate difference
USA – EU
1990-1995 1995-2000 (3) = (2)-(1)
(1) (2)
Total Economy -0.8 1.1 1.9
ICT Producing Industries 1.4 1.4 0.0
ICT Producing Manufacturing 4.0 9.9 5.9
ICT Producing Services -1.3 -4.7 -3.4
ICT Using Industries -0.2 3.1 3.3
ICT Using Manufacturing -3.4 -0.9 2.5
ICT Using Services 0.8 4.0 3.2
Non-ICT Industries -1.4 -0.2 1.2
Non-ICT Manufacturing -0.8 -0.1 0.7
Non-ICT Services -1.0 0.2 1.2
Non-ICT Other -2.0 -1.3 0.9
Source: Own calculations from the data of Table 1.
Even in the period between 1995 and 2000, the productivity
growth rate was higher in the EU in the majority of the sec-
tors (four out of the seven). The USA, therefore, was only able
to increase the rate of productivity growth in one area, non-ICT
services, which earlier increased slower than in the EU to a level
higher than in Europe. The earlier -1% disadvantage of the USA
was reversed into an advantage of 0.2%. Still, even in case of the
non-ICT industries the productivity growth rates more or less
equalled out, and even though the advantage of the USA pro-
ductivity growth rate did not register an overall increase in ICT
producing industries, the earlier, slight disadvantage that was in
place for ICT-using industries was turned into a significant ad-
vantage. ICT producing services emerged by this period as hav-
ing the biggest productivity growth advantage of the EU, while
in the United States ICT producing manufacturing remained the
area with the highest advantage.
Changes of similar direction took place in productivity
growth rates in most of the areas in the two regions. In three
of the four areas related to ICT, the productivity growth rate in-
creased, while in two of the three non-ICT areas a decrease was
registered in both regions. Changes of opposite directions took
place partly in ICT-using manufacturing where, contrary to the
acceleration of the productivity growth rate in the USA, corre-
sponds to the acceleration typical of the ICT industries, a decel-
eration was measured in the EU (nevertheless, it was still this
area where productivity increased the fastest). The other area
where changes of opposite directions were registered was the
area of non-ICT services, where the decrease in the productivity
growth rate in the EU was more in line with the general non-
ICT tendencies, in contrast with the USA where an increase of
growth rate was experienced.
The second of the two changes mentioned above not in com-
pliance with the general directions of changes had a much
stronger impact on the overall productivity growth rates of the
two economies. This is because in case the above tendency had
not taken place in the field of non-ICT services, which repre-
sents a very significant proportion of the economy (43% in the
USA in 2000), but rather the productivity growth rate of the
USA had remained unchanged (or especially if the difference
had remained unchanged between the productivity growth rates
of the non-ICT service sectors of the EU and the USA), then the
entire productivity growth rate of the US economy would have
been some 0.4 to 0.6% lower in the second half of the 1990s.
In the last column of Table 2 we can only find one negative
number, what means that in the second half of the 1990s the EU
was only able to accelerate its production growth rate in com-
parison with the USA in a single sector. This sector was ICT
producing services where, as a result of the basically opposite
tendencies that took place in the two regions (2.1% increase in
the EU and 1.3% decrease in the EU in the respective rates of
growth), the EU improved its relative productivity growth posi-
tion by an annual rate of 3.4%. Due to this, and also to the 1.3%
rate difference that had already been in place in the first half of
the 1990s in favour of the EU, the situation arose in the second
half of the decade, whereby the EU was able to increase its level
of productivity in ICT producing services 4.7% faster per year
than the US.
By contrast, in all other sectors, the USA improved its rel-
ative productivity growth rate increase positions. From among
these, in absolute value, the 5.9% increase in relative produc-
tivity growth rate in case of ICT producing manufacturing was
the highest, but the most significant in terms of their effects on
the increase of the productivity growth of the entirety of the two
regions, the 3.2% improvement in relative position in case of
ICT-using services and the 1.2% improvement in case of non-
ICT services were the most significant. On the whole, therefore,
the relative acceleration of the productivity growth rate of the
US in comparison with the EU in the second half of the 1990s
was mostly due to the improvement of its position in the pro-
ductivity growth rate in the field of services. This, however, is
fundamentally true due to the major weight of the service sector
in the economy.
In an even more detailed sectoral breakdown2 of the produc-
tivity growth rate of certain sectors of the economy of the EU
and the USA, a very high and even increasing correlation was
found (cf. Table 3).
Still, if we browse through the list containing 56 sectors, we
find as many as five sectors in the period between 1995 and 2001
where the productivity growth rate achieved by the USA was
more than 5% higher than the productivity growth rate of the
EU. At the same time, there was only one sector where the op-
2 See the tables in the volume edited by O’Mahony, M and van Ark, B (2003).
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Tab. 3. The correlation between the sectoral productivity growth rates of the
EU and the US (correlation with the productivity growth of USA sectors)
1979-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001
EU-15 0.84 0.87 0.93
Source: O’Mahony, M - vanArk, B (ed.) (2003)
posite was true. It is worth noting that the five sectors mentioned
above include both wholesale trade and retailing. In addition to
these two trade sectors, it was due mainly to the higher growth
rate achieved on the market of insurance services that the im-
provement of the relative position in the field of non-ICT ser-
vices in the USA was due to.
From the above findings we can come to the conclusion that
the improvement of the productivity growth rate position of the
USA in comparison with the EU was, in a large part, due to
factors such as satisfying and adjusting to the demands of the
consumers and users in the definition of the character, and de-
velopment objectives of the new technologies (in our reports, the
production of ICT-related sectors) much better than in Europe.
On the other hand, we can also draw the conclusion that users in
the USA were also much more receptive to new technologies.
6 Capital Formation, Capital Stock
It was shown above how closely the higher productivity
growth rate and increase of the GDP in the US is related to the
earlier and more successful development, as well as the more
extensive application or ICT technologies. Let us now consider
how this hypothesis is supported by the data on the structural
composition of the capital stock and its growth.
Table 4 presents the data related to the gross fixed capital for-
mation and fixed capital stock increase from the early 1980s in
the EU and the USA. Since the ICT areas underwent a partic-
ularly quick technological development, and a significant drop
in prices was consequently experienced, it is worth looking at
these changes in both current and constant prices.
It can be seen from the table that even though some differ-
ences can be found between the two regions with respect to
the capital formation and the increase of capital stock, how-
ever, these do not show any clear, uniform tendencies that could
explain why the ICT-related sectors of the USA experienced a
growth so significantly faster both in individual areas and on the
whole, as discussed above. As soon as we insert the starting
data of the growth, the lines showing the basic figures, we will
see that over the entire period, the volume of ICT capital forma-
tion and ICT capital stock in the USA was 1.5 to 2.5 times the
comparable values of the EU.
We can also see that ICT formation in 1980 was only a frac-
tion of the volume of other, non-ICT capital formation in both
regions. This is even more characteristic of capital stock fig-
ures. In the light of the above it is even less evident why, over
the period of almost a quarter of a century, the EU was unable to
devote a role to ICT capital in a way similar to the USA, despite
the fact the role of the ICT sectors in economic development
has been regarded of fundamental importance for decades, and
the productivity growth rate differences between the individual
sectors would also have amply justified even faster structural
changes. Once again, this is evidence for the structural rigidity
of the European economy, which is much less flexible in com-
parison with its American counterpart.
It is worth staying with this table for another moment, as it
also shows that the fixed capital stock in the USA expanded in a
structure and to a degree that promotes growth to a much higher
extent. The data related to combine fixed capital formation in-
dicate that, while the rate of fixed capital formation was slightly
higher in the EU during the 1980s, the USA accumulated capi-
tal at a much higher rate in the 1990s and the early years of the
new millennium. From the middle of the 1990s, the expansion
rate of whole of the capital stock was higher in the USA than in
Europe.
7 Comparison of Marginal Products of Capital
Important conclusions can be drawn on the basis of compar-
ing estimates of the marginal products of capital. The marginal
product of capital usually decreases as the level of development
in a country increases; in other words, it is lower in developed
countries than in less developed ones. This statement is trace-
able3 in Table 5, even though only the more developed countries
are shown here. Nevertheless, the differences of development
between countries should also be reflected in the data in this ta-
ble. With respect to the USA, however, the above statement is
not true at all. As we can see in the figures, with the exception of
one country (not accidentally, this country is Ireland, which car-
ried out something of an economic miracle) the marginal prod-
uct of capital data are higher for each of the EU countries.
3 This conclusion also follows from the point of view of economic theory,
whereby better capital supply results in lower marginal product of capital, and
vice versa.
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Tab. 4. Capital Formation and Capital Stocks in the Eu and the US (growth rate, %)
Gross fixed capital formation Gross fixed capital stock
in constent 2000 prices (in current prices) (in constent 2000 prices)
EU USA EU USA EU USA
IT equipment
1980-1990 19.2 15.6 12.7 8.8 19.8 19.1
1990-1995 11.4 17.4 1.8 7.4 10.8 12.1
1995-2000 33.4 27.5 9.8 5.3 28.2 25.5
2000-2004 8.4 16.3 -4.4 3.1 16.5 17.4
1980 bill C 1.29 2.86 13 28.5 2.9 5.9
Communication equipment
1980-1990 6.2 4.6 9.1 7.1 6.0 7.7
1990-1995 3.5 6.3 3.4 5.4 5.6 4.7
1995-2000 12.5 16.1 9.1 12.8 7.4 9.4
2000-2004 -3.1 -1.8 -4.5 -4.5 5.9 7.4
1980 bill C or $ 15 28.9 13.4 27.6 83.8 128.2
Software
1980-1990 17.5 16.5 18.4 16.5 17.2 16.3
1990-1995 8.9 10.0 7.3 7.6 10.2 12.8
1995-2000 11.3 17.2 11.3 16.5 11.8 15.6
2000-2004 1.2 2.8 0.6 1.6 4.8 5.4
1980 bill C or $ 5.5 9.7 5.5 11.3 9.9 16.6
Non-ICT equipment
1980-1990 2.7 2.0 7.6 5.9 2.0 2.3
1990-1995 -2.9 1.3 0.3 3.8 1.5 1.5
1995-2000 2.5 3.4 5.9 4.4 1.1 2.7
2000-2004 -4.2 2.5 -0.6 3.4 -0.4 2.2
1980 bill C or $ 306.9 255.8 136.3 144.8 1933.8 1602.2
Transport equipment
1980-1990 2.0 0.5 8.2 4.2 1.3 0.9
1990-1995 -2.6 7.6 1.1 11.0 0.5 2.8
1995-2000 6.8 5.3 8.6 6.1 3.0 6.1
2000-2004 -0.3 -4.4 0.5 -2.4 2.9 0.0
1980 bill C or $ 117.1 89.7 48.1 50.7 554.8 457.7
Non residential structures
1980-1990 2.3 1.3 7.1 4.9 3.4 3.0
1990-1995 -1.6 -1.0 1.1 1.5 3.0 1.9
1995-2000 2.0 4.2 3.9 7.8 2.2 2.2
2000-2004 3.0 -2.6 4.3 0.9 2.4 1.9
1980 bill C or $ 405.3 371.9 197.7 190.2 5608.3 5816.0
Total
1980-1990 2.8 2.1 7.9 6.1 3.1 2.9
1990-1995 -1.5 2.2 1.2 4.5 2.7 2.1
1995-2000 4.8 7.6 6.1 7.7 2.4 3.2
2000-2004 0.6 1.5 1.3 1.0 2.2 2.6
1980 bill C or $ 851.2 759.0 414.0 453.2 8193.6 8026.6
Source: Own calculations from the data of Groningen Gross and Development Center, Total Economy Database. www.ggdc.net
Where:
y :the income (GDP) per one employee
k :the capital stock per one employee
α :the share of the capital stock in the GDP
Py :prices of output goods
Pk :prices of capital goods
Py/Pk :the price ratio of output and capital goods
MPK :the marginal product of capital
PMPK:marginal product of capital corrected with rela-
tive prices
With respect to the USA, the Table 5 indicates two more re-
markable facts: on the one hand, the prices of capital goods were
relatively low in comparison with the general prices of products,
and so the data for the USA in the fourth column of the table
indicating the proportion of prices of output and capital goods
shows a value that is higher for any of the EU countries, and the
only country in the table that has an even higher figure is Hong
Kong.
The price ratios of the USA and Europe are, therefore, dif-
ferent: while in the USA the capital goods are relatively inex-
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Tab. 5. Estimates for the marginal product of capital data
y k α Py/Pk MPK PMPK
AUT 45822 135769 0.30 1.06 0.10 0.11
BEL 50600 141919 0.26 1.15 0.09 0.11
DEN 45147 122320 0.29 1.13 0.11 0.12
ESP 39034 110024 0.33 1.06 0.12 0.12
FIN 39611 124132 0.29 1.23 0.09 0.11
FRA 45152 134979 0.26 1.20 0.09 0.10
GBR 40620 87778 0.25 1.07 0.12 0.12
GRE 31329 88186 0.21 1.03 0.07 0.08
IRL 47977 85133 0.27 1.05 0.15 0.16
ITA 51060 139033 0.29 1.08 0.11 0.11
NLD 45940 122476 0.33 1.03 0.12 0.13
SWE 40125 109414 0.23 1.19 0.08 0.10
PRT 30086 71045 0.28 0.97 0.12 0.12
USA 57259 125583 0.26 1.16 0.12 0.14
AUS 46436 118831 0.32 1.07 0.13 0.13
NZL 37566 95965 0.33 1.04 0.13 0.13
CAN 45304 122326 0.32 1.26 0.12 0.15
HKG 51678 114351 0.43 0.90 0.19 0.18
NOR 50275 161986 0.39 1.14 0.12 0.14
KOR 34 382 98055 0.35 1.09 0.12 0.13
JAP 37962 132953 0.32 1.12 0.09 0.10
Source: Caselli, F. – Freyer, J. (2005)
pensive and the consumer goods are relatively expensive, in the
EU it is the other way round, as the capital goods are relatively
expensive and the consumer goods are relatively cheap. These
proportions encourage investment and keep back consumption
in the USA, while in Europe they motivate people to consume
and restrain investments. As we can see in Table 5, as a con-
sequence of this encouragement, the USA carried out a more
significant capital accumulation in the past decade.
On the other hand, the other surprising fact that can be seen
here is that in the USA the capital share in the GDP is relatively
low. Among the member-states of the EU this proportion is only
lower in Sweden, while in the majority of the countries included
in the table the share of capital stock in the GDP is 10 to 20%
higher. These proportions actually correspond to the differences
in the price ratios discussed above.
Fig. 2 was prepared from the data of the first two columns of
the table. The situation of the USA in this figure shows how
much more efficiently the capital stock is utilized in the USA
than in the other developed countries, since the income per em-
ployee is much higher there despite the fact that the capital stock
per employee is more or less the same (in the data measured on
the vertical axis, the USA is not high above the other developed
countries). While in terms of expenditures the “investments”
made by the USA and the other developed countries is quite
similar, when we consider the output (data), the USA is high
above the general level of the developed countries, due to its
higher efficiency.
From the figures of Table 6 we can see that in the field of cap-
ital formation – considering the share of ICT capital formation
Source: Caselli, F. – Freyer, J. (2005)
Fig. 2. Capital supply and productivity
in comparison with the total of capital formation – even after
two decades, in the early years of the new millennium, the EU
hardly reached the proportions achieved by the USA already in
the eighties. The situation is similar in terms of IT investments,
too.
Tab. 6. Proportions of gross fixed capital formation and IT investments in a
percentage of the GDP
1980 1985 1990 1995 2001
Office and Computer Equip-
ment
EU 3.1 5.4 5.1 5.1 5.7
US 6.2 9.3 8.2 9.6 6.8
Communication Equipment
EU 2.9 3.7 3.6 4.1 4.4
US 6.6 7.3 7.1 6.7 7.0
Software
EU 1.2 3.0 3.9 5.3 7.1
US 2.7 4.7 7.5 9.3 13.9
Total ICT
EU 7.2 12.0 12.6 14.5 17.2
US 15.5 21.3 22.8 25.6 27.7
Non-ICT Equipment
EU 33.9 33.7 32.2 30.5 29.7
US 31.8 28.2 31.0 30.3 27.5
Transport Equipment
EU 11.3 11.5 11.8 11.7 13.3
US 10.8 10.7 8.9 12.4 10.7
Non-Residential Buildings
EU 47.6 42.8 43.4 43.3 39.7
US 41.9 39.8 37.3 31.7 34.1
Total Non-ICT
EU 92.8 88.0 87.4 85.5 82.8
US 84.5 78.7 77.2 74.4 72.3
IT Investment as % of GDP
EU 1.2 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.6
US 2.5 3.4 3.3 3.7 4.2
Source: Groningen Gross and Development Center,
Total Economy Database. www.ggdc.net
If we examine how the share of the ICT capital income relates
to either the GDP or to the total capital income (Table 7), we
can see that in this respect the EU never reached and (in view
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of the downward tendency that is since characteristic in both
regions) is not even likely ever to reach the 1.5 to 2 times higher
proportions that the USA featured already at the beginning of
the period examined.
Tab. 7. The proportion of the ICT capital income in comparison with the
GDP (1) and with the total capital income (2)
(1) (2)
1980
USA 4.3 15.2
EU 2.5 8.9
1990
USA 5.3 18.0
EU 3.4 10.6
2000
USA 6.2 21.2
EU .6 0.6
2004
USA 5.8 18.9
EU 3.4 9.9
Source: Own calculations from the Groningen
Gross and Development Center, Total Economy Database. www.ggdc.net
I also examined one other proportion in connection with ICT,
which is the volume of ICT capital stock per one working hour
(Table 8). The figures of both regions are given in 2000 con-
stant prices. The figures of the EU are given in EUR, while
those of the USA are provided in USD. Since the EUR/USD ex-
change rate in 2000 was 1.085 (cf. www.oanda.com), in other
words, even if we multiply the results calculated in EUR with
this exchange rate, this would not cause any material change in
the significant differences in favour of the USA, which can be
clearly seen in the table. In the USA, the proportion of ICT
capital income in comparison with both the GDP and with the
total capital income was 1.5 to 2 times higher than in Europe
throughout the entire quarter-century period, and the European
Union did not succeed in catching up with the United States at
all.
Tab. 8. ICT capital stock per one working hour (at 2000 constant prices).
Source: Own calculations from the Groningen Gross and Development Center,
Total Economy Database. www.ggdc.net
EU (C) USA ($)
1980 0.398 (0.43) 0.818
1990 0.905 (0.98) 1.832
2000 2.395 (2.6) 4.536
2004 3.337 (3.62) 6.728
8 Summary
The data analysed above convincingly show howmuch less of
an impact the ICT revolution had on the economy and society of
the EU than in the USA, and how much less capable these leaps
and bounds in technological development were to transform and
3The figures in brackets are the figures of the EU per one working our, given
in USD, calculated at the average 1.085 exchange rate valid in 2000.
dynamize the European Union than the United States. In com-
parison with the USA, the European Union was characterized
in the period examined by structural rigidity, inflexibility and
insufficient adjustment to the demands of consumers and users.
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